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Restitution-1963 Tennessee Survey
I. Brad Reed*
I. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST AND EQUITABLE LIEN
H. CONTRBMT
ON AND INDEMNITY

III.

RESCISSION

A. Mistake
B. Fraudand Duress

I.

CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST AND EQUITABLE LIEN

Constructive trusts are related to the field of trusts in somewhat the

same way that quasi-contracts are today related to the field of conracts-in misnomer only. A judicial declaration of a constructive trust

means simply that the holder of legal title to the property affected,
must convey it to the person for whose benefit the constructive trust
is declared.' The primary efficacy of this equitable remedy is that it
gives the successful complainant a preference over all the defendant's
creditors; its theory is not that the complainant is trying to reach the
defendant's property, but rather that the property which the defendant holds belongs to the complainant.2 A preference over general

creditors is also obtained by a party in whose favor a court establishes
an equitable lien. 3 These two remedies overlap to a significant

extent; generally either is available to a complainant whose property
has been misappropriated by the defendant under such circumstances

that the defendant holds legal title. 4 The gravamen of both is unjust

* Associate, Bass, Berry & Sims, Nashville, Tennessee; Editor in Chief, Vanderbilt
Law Review, 1963-64.
1. Professor Austin Scott, who served as reporter for that part of the Restatement

of Restitution dealing with constructive trusts, uses the following as a rough descrip-

tion: "A constructive trust arises where a person who holds title to property is
subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be
unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it....
He is not compelled to convey
the property because he is a constructive trustee; it is because he can be compelled to
convey it that he is a constructive trustee." 4 ScoTr, TRUSTS § 462, at 3103 (2d ed.
1956).
2. This point is well illustrated by Preston v. Moore, 133 Tenn. 247, 180 S.W. 320
(1915), where M misappropriated P's money and used it to purchase some land and
build a house thereon. In the suit that followed P traced the funds into the realty, but
the trial court held that M was entitled to a homestead because of the exemption
statute. Shannon's Code § 3798 (1896) (now TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-301 (1956)).
The supreme court held that M could not obtain a homestead against P. P was not a
creditor seeking to enforce a claim against M's property; his claim was in the property
itself, not merely against M.
3. "Where property of one person can by a proceeding in equity be reached by
another as security for a claim on the ground that otherwise the former would be
unjustly enriched, an equitable lien arises." RESTATEMENT, REsTrrTuTON § 161 (1937).

4. See id. § 161, comment a.
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enrichment; both presuppose that legal title to the property in question is held by the defendant; both result only from judicial declaration and both result in a preference over general creditors (so far
as the relevant property is concerned). The primary difference
between these remedies lies in the nature of the interest in the
property held by the defendant which a court grants to a successful
complainant. This can be best understood in a "mingled fund" context-under an equitable lien theory the successful complainant has
"a lien upon the mingled fund for the amount [of his contribution]
that went into it"; 5 one in whose favor a constructive trust is established receives "a share of the mingled fund in such proportion as
his contribution to the fund bears to the whole of the fund."6 An
example will perhaps be helpful. Assume that an attorney puts one
hundred dollars belonging to his client into his own bank account,
which already contains two hundred dollars belonging to the attorney.
Under a constructive trust theory, the client has a one-third interest
in the bank account and a one-third interest in all funds withdrawn
from the account 7 assuming no subsequent additions to the account
of the attorney's own money.8 This interest in the money withdrawn
from the fund will be important only if the withdrawals (1) are not
dissipated (1/3 x 0 = 0), or (2) are not paid to a bona fide
purchaser. 9 Under an equitable lien theory, the client has a lien to
the extent of one hundred dollars on the bank account and a similar
lien on all withdrawals from the account, 0 again unless the recipient
of the withdrawals is a bona fide purchaser. It should be noted that
a person who has an equitable lien, like the holder of a judgment lien,
cannot recover more than the amount due him; on the other hand,
a party in whose favor a constructive trust has been declared may
profit considerably through wise investments purchased by the wrong5. 4 ScoTr, op. cit. supra note 1, § 515, at 3289.

6. Ibid.
7. The most common example of the importance of a constructive trust in withdrawals from such a fund is the situation where one who has wrongfully mingled
another's funds

with his own uses the money to

pay for insurance premiums

on his life and later dies. In such a case it is almost universally held that the person
whose money has been so used can share pro rata in the proceeds of the policy. The
cases are collected in Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 672 (1952).

8. Subsequent additions would result in a proportionate reduction in the client's share
of the fund.
9. RESTATEmENT, REsTrrtioN § 172 (1937).
10. The development of the rule allowing an equitable lien to attach to withdrawals
from the mingled fund provides an interesting example of the ingenuity of the
common law in adapting itself to changing situations. See Clayton's Case, 1 Mer. 572,
35 Eng. Rep. 781 (Ch. 1816); Knatchbull v. Hallett, 13 Ch. D. 696 (C.A. 1880); In re
Oatway [1903] 2 Ch. D. 356; In re Kountze Bros. 79 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1935). The
first three of these cases are discussed in 4 Scorr, op. cit. supra §§ 517, 517.1.
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doer with the mingled fund."- It is therefore required that the
defendant be a conscious wrongdoer before the complainant can
recover more than his loss.12
In State ex rel. Moulton v. Holland,13 the state had formerly

condemned mortgaged property for highway purposes but had neglected to discover the existence of the mortgage. Consequently the
full value of the property (35,000 dollars) had been awarded and
paid the mortgagor, H, who had failed to mention the fact that the
property was mortgaged. Sometime later C, the mortgagee, instituted
an action against the state to recover the amount of the indebtedness
secured by the mortgage (14,000 dollars). The state then filed the
present suit to enjoin C's action; in the alternative the bill requested
that, in the event the state was required to pay C, the fund awarded
to H be impressed with a constructive trust in favor of C and that the
state be subrogated to C's rights against H. The court of appeals for
the eastern section held, first, that C's action against the state was
not barred. 14 The court then held that H had been unjustly enriched
in the amount of the mortgage indebtedness, because he knew at the
time of the condemnation suit (1) that the property was encumbered
by the mortgage and (2) that this fact was unknown to the state,
the court, and the jury.'5 Because of H's conduct (or lack of it), C
could have had a constructive trust imposed upon the property for
his benefit. Since C has, however, chosen to pursue his remedy
against the state, the validity of which has been sustained, 16 the
state was held entitled to be subrogated to C's remedy against H.
The court noted that the state's claim could not exceed 14,000 dollars,
"leaving [of the 35,000 dollars awarded H] some $21,000 not subject
11. If in our hypothetical the attorney had bought stock with 75 dollars from the
mingled fund and at the time of the suit the stock was worth 900 dollars, the client,
utilizing a constructive trust theory, would be entitled to one-third of the 225 dollars
remaining in the account and one-third of the value of the stock. Under an equitable
lien theory, however, the client would have originally had a lien of 75 dollars on the
stock, which would have risen to 100 dollars when the value of the stock reached that
amount; but the lien on the stock could never exceed 100 dollars, no matter what
the value of the stock. He would, of course, also have retained a 100 dollar lien on
the remainder of the fund.
12. RESTATEmNT, REsTrrtmoN § 210 (1937), especially comment b; see generally
Monaghan, Constructive Trust and Equitable Lien: Status of the Conscious and the
Innocent Wrongdoer in Equity, 38 U. DEr. L.J. 10 (1960).
13. 367 S.W.2d 791 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1962).
14. The reason given was that there was no proof that C, the mortgagee, "knew
the jury would assess the damages on the false assumption the State would get a title
free of his encumbrance or, if not, that the mortgagors would be allowed to
appropriate the money to their own use and not pay the mortgage debt." Id. at 794.
15. H "remained silent when it was [his] duty in all good conscience and honesty
to speak and accepted the money rightfully due the mortgagee knowing that he would
have an action against the condemnor to recover a second time for the same property."
367 S.W.2d at 795.
16. See note 14, supra and accompanying text.
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to the trust. This latter sum was received.., free of the trust .... "I'
Of the money he had received, H had used 12,000 dollars to repay a
debt. "We must assume that [the loan] was paid out of that portion
of the award not affected with a trust." 8
The result in this case is clearly correct, though the state seems
to have employed an unnecessarily complicated legal theory. An
action against H for unjust enrichment through overpayment by
mistake would have been entirely proper.'9 Moreover, although the
20
court speaks in terms of a constructive trust, its later statements
indicate that actually an equitable lien theory was utilized. 21 Applying
the analysis discussed above to the instant case, if the court had in
fact applied a constructive trust theory, the interest which the state
would have acquired through being subrogated to the rights of C,
the mortgagee, would have been 14/35 of the fund paid to H and
14/35 of all withdrawals, 22 unless the withdrawals were paid to a bona
fide purchaser. Under the equitable lien theory which was in fact
applied the state had a lien of 14,000 dollars on the fund and a
similar lien of up to 14,000 dollars on any withdrawals by H from the
fund, 3 again subject to the bona fide purchaser exception.
17. 367 S.W.2d at 795-96.
18. Id. at 796. The fee of H's attorney in the condemnation suit had also been
paid from the fund; its amount was not revealed.
19. See Guild v. Baldridge, 32 Tenn. 294 (1852). See also Bridges v. Freshour,
12 Tenn. App. 188, 195 (E.S. 1930), in which B paid K on a promissory note when
the money was due to F. (K had told B that he would turn the money over to F,
but he did not do so.) The court held that since B was still liable to F, B could recover from K the money paid to him. It should also be noted that in the instant case
C's rights against H, to which the state could be subrogated, could have been established
by an action at law for money bad and received. The earliest American case in point,
Sergeant & Harris v. Stryker, 16 N.J.L. 464, 32 Am. Dec. 404 (1838), denied recovery
on the inane ground that there was no privity between the plaintiff and the defendant,
whose wrongful conduct had caused a reward to be paid to him which should have
been paid to the plaintiff. The correct view is well enunciated in Heywood v.
Northern Assur. Co., 133 Minn. 360, 158 N.W. 632 (1916), and is the rule in Tennessee. Dickson v. Cunningham, 8 Tenn. 203, 221 (1827).
20. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
21. As noted, the two remedies are often interchangeable. See note 4, supra and
accompanying text.
22. Apparently none of the fund received by H was profitably invested. The
question of whether H was a "conscious wrongdoer" so that the state could share in
the profits of such investments would, therefore, not be relevant, though it seems that
H's conduct was sufficient to meet this standard. See note 15 supra.
23. E.g., if H had bought a Cadillac for 7,000 dollars with the money he received
from the state, the latter would have a lien on the car for its full value; and if the
car for some reason appreciated in value, the lien would correspondingly increase up
to 14,000 dollars. If H had bought a Bentley for 20,000 dollars, the amount of the
lien would be 14,000 dollars. If he had bought both, liens would attach to both,
though the state's recovery would be limited to 14,000 dollars.
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CONTMRIUTION AND INDEMNITY
Chamberlain v. McCleary. 4 an automobile accident
II.

In
case, District Judge Wilson, applying Tennessee law, dismissed a cross-claim
for contribution against the plaintiffs husband, who was driving the
car in which the plaintiff was riding at the time of the accident:
"[W]here one of two tortfeasors is the beneficiary of a domestic
immunity as regards the plaintiff, such immunity is to be protected,
if at all,25 by denying [the other tortfeasor] the right to contribution
from the immune party ..... " Judge Wilson recognized that
his decision was contrary to the basis of the Tennessee Supreme
Court's decision in Graham v. Miller,27 where in a similar situation the
plaintiff was denied relief on the ground that, had he recovered, the
"non-immune" tortfeasor could have obtained contribution from the
"immune" tortfeasor. In an excellent and thorough opinion Judge
Wilson concluded that Graham v. Miller would not today be followed
by the courts of Tennesseem because of the well-established rule that,
29
unless common liability exists, there is no right to contribution.
Thus, if the familial immunity requires the dismissal of either the
plaintiff's action for negligence or the defendant's cross-action for
contribution, the choice of the latter best accommodates society's
conflicting interests; denying the blameless injured person a remedy
against both wrongdoers, merely because one of them is the recipient
of an immunity, is unduly harsh. 30 A parity of reasoning led to the
dismissal on the defendanfs cross-claim for indemnity, which had
been based upon the tenuous distinction between active and passive
negligence. A recent decision by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
involving the same relevant facts sustained both the plaintiffs right
of action against the non-immune defendant and the latter's crossaction for contribution against the immune party. 31 It is difficult to
24. 217 F. Supp. 591 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
25. As to the present desirability of interspousal immunity, see 27 TENN. L. REv. 422

(1960).
26. 217 F. Supp. at 596. The doctrine of contribution inthis state isdiscussed in
Wade, Restitution-1962 Tennessee Survey, 16 VAND. L. REv. 857, 860 (1963).
27. 182 Tenn. 434, 187 S.W.2d 622 (1945).
28. "As between an innocent and injured plaintiff and the party causing the injury
by culpable conduct, that rule [of Graham v. Miller] favored the latter by extending
to him the purely personal domestic immunity of his co-tortfeasor." 217 F. Supp. at
593-94. Graham v. Miller is strongly criticized in 27 TENN. L. Rnv. 422, 427 (1960).
29. Citing Vaughn v. Gill, 264 S.W.2d 805 (1954) (withdrawn from official publication), and Davis v. Broad Street Garage, 191 Tenn. 320, 232 S.W.2d 355 (1950),
both decided after Graham v. Miller.
30. However, it is clear that so long as domestic immunities are recognized a
plaintiff who has been injured by the recipient of such an immunity cannot recover
from a defendant whose liability would be wholly derivative.
31. Bedell v. Reagan, 192 A.2d 24 (Me. 1963). Maine, like Tennessee, has
preserved interspousal immunity.
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see how this Maine decision is inconsistent with the purposes of
interspousal immunity, especially when, as in Tennessee, the action
for contribution cannot be tried in the same action as the original
claim but must be pursued in a separate suit. Judge Wilson apparently
deemed himself precluded by Tennessee decisions from reaching this
result and was forced to settle for the more palatable of two insipid
alternatives.
It is well settled that an injured employee of a subcontractor may
recover under the Tennessee Workmen's Compensation Law from
the intermediate or principal contractors, 2 even though his immediate
employer is exempt from the act because he has less than five regular
employees.3 In Tayloe Paper Co. v. Jameson Construction Co.,- an
employee of such an exempt subcontractor had recovered judgments
against both the intermediate and general contractors and had been
paid in full by the former, who then brought this suit for contribution
against the general contractor. The supreme court found the workmen's compensation act inapplicable and determined the case on
"equitable principles." The court denied contribution by adopting a
tier theory of liability, imposing upon each subordinate contractor
the duty to indemnify any superior contractor who pays the injured
employee. This holding may be analogized to the order of liability
on a bearer promissory note with the employee as the holder, the
subcontractor as the maker, the intermediate contractor as the first
endorser and the general contractor as the second endorser.
A difficulty with this reasoning is that the case on which the
court places exclusive reliance 35 was between a general contractor
and a subcontractor who was the immediate employer of the injured
workman. There it can readily be said that the liability of the latter
is "primary" and that of the former is only "secondary"; in the instant
case, however, the liability of both parties is "secondary," as that term
is used above. The announced rule will result in no injustice so long
as both parties are insured, but it may prove rather harsh if the
intermediate contractor is not insured. The court in Tayloe also
implied in dictum that the intermediate contractor was entitled to
indemnity from the subcontractor, apparently overlooking the fact
that the latter was specifically exempt from the act.6 The statement
must thus be regarded as dictum.
32. TENN. ConE ANN.§ 50-915 (1956).
33. Bowling v. Whitley, 208 Tenn. 657, 348 S.W.2d 310 (1961). See 1
WORMvEN'S COMPENSA ION 724 n.7 and accompanying text.
34. 211 Tenn. 232, 364 S.W.2d 882 (1963).
35. Johnson v. Mortenson, 110 Conn. 221, 147 AtI. 705 (1929).
36. TENN. CODEANN.§ 50-906(d) (1956).

LARSON,
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Roberson v. Bitner37 marks the second time that a federal court
has determined that a cross-action for indemnity against an injured
workman's employer is not barred by the Tennessee Workmen's
Compensation Law. The state courts have not yet passed on the
question.
III. RESCISSION
A. Mistake
Co. v. United States, the govern&
Metal
Iron
In East Tennessee
ment at public auction had sold to the plaintiff an item listed in the
auction catalog merely as "Building w/ contents." Later, before the
building was turned over to plaintiff, it was discovered that certain
"black powder" stored in the building was rutile (an ore from which
titanium is extracted). It was uncontroverted that at the time of
making the contract neither party was aware of the nature of the
"powder." The government refused to deliver the rutile and the
plaintiff instituted this action for its value. Judge Taylor held that
under the circumstances of the case title to the rutile passed to the
plaintiff, who was therefore entitled to recovery. 39 From the opinion
it appears that the government did not ask that the entire contract
be rescinded on the basis of mistake. Had it done so it would undoubtedly have been met with the assertion that it had assumed
40
the risk that the "black powder" would prove to be valuable.
Because of the language of the government's advertisement ("Building w/ contents"), a finding that the government did assume this
risk would be likely.
37. 221 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Tenn. 1963). The earlier case was General Elec. Co. v.
Moretz, 270 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1959), discussed in Harbison, Third-Party Liability

and Adjustments Between Different Employers and Insurance Carriers in Tennessee,
16 VAND.L. REv. 1113, 1119 (1963).

38. 218 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
39. The court relied on two cases, United States v. Jones, 176 F.2d 278 (9th Cir.
1949), and Turney v. United States, 126 Ct. Cl. 202, 115 F. Supp. 457 (1953). In
Jones the purchaser knew that included in the property were valuable goods which
the government did not intend to sell. Judge Taylor rightly concluded that the present
case was a stronger one for the purchaser; but he failed to note that the only reason
the government lost its case in Jones was that the court read a statute there relevant
as requiring actual fraud on the purchaser's part before the government would be
entitled to rescission.
40. RESTATEmNT, RESTrTUON § 12 (1937) ("Unilateral Mistake in Bargains"),
illus. 4 is as follows: "A offers at auction 'a chest and contents,' believing that the
chest contains only some cloth of little value, making no statements but exposing the
contents. B bids $50. It is discovered that one of the pieces of cloth is worth at
least $100. A is not entitled to restitution." The result in this example seems to be
based on the fact that both A and B knew the contents of the chest, A assuming the
risk that the cloth was worth more than B bid, and B assuming the risk that it was worth
less. This situation is to be contrasted with the "dead horse" cases, in which an erroneous assumption by both parties is the basis of the contract. See RESTATEiENT,
CONTRACTS

§ 502 (1932). An example is the case where two parties contract for the
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In Warren v. Crockett,4 1 the plaintiff had been riding in her husband's car when it was struck by defendant's car. She was immediately examined by a doctor who found no injury, though he told her
that "'she had a possible whiplash injury and it might give her trouble
in the future."' 42 Shortly thereafter the defendant's insurer settled
with the plaintiff and her husband, who both signed a general release
covering property damage and "all known, unknown, foreseen and
unforeseen, bodily and personal injuries' ";43 but the amount paid by
the insurer included nothing for personal injury to plaintiff.44 Months
later she was hospitalized for a whiplash injury; it was apparently
conceded that this injury resulted from the accident. The Tennessee
Supreme Court, reversing the court of appeals, held that the facts
presented a jury question as to whether the release had been signed
under such a mutual mistake of fact as to warrant rescission and
upheld a judgment for the plaintiff. The court quoted from an earlier
opinion as follows: "Mutual mistake as to the nature or extent of
injuries is considered good cause for avoidance of a settlement, but
the mistake must relate to a past or present fact, not an opinion as
to the result of a known fact."45 This decision is in accord with the
great weight of authority on this point.46 Most courts simply dissale of goods which are, at the time of the contract, at sea. If, unknown to either
of the parties, the ship had sunk before the contract was made, the buyer is
entitled to rescission, unless it can be shown from the circumstances that he had
assumed the risk that the ship had already been lost. In Irwin v. Burnett, 25 Tenn.
342 (1845), B sold I a slave which at the time was in R's hands. Both B and I assumed
that R would return the slave on request; in fact R had taken him out of the country
and refused to deliver him. In holding that I was not liable to B for the purchase
price, the Tennessee Supreme Court said: "[O]n the subject of delivering the slave ...
[B and I] were both alike mistaken. The slave at the time, in view of the dispositions
and acts of . . . [R], was as much lost to [I] as if he had been dead. If this latter
state of things had existed, [I] could not have been held to the payment of the price,
unless he had taken upon himself the risk of that event; nor will he be held to the
payment of the price under the circumstances of this case, unless it could be made to
appear expressly or by legitimate inference from the nature of the transaction, that [1]
took upon himself the risk of delivery by [R], and contracted to be paid at all events."
Compare Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887), with Backus v.
MaeLaury, 278 App. Div. 504, 106 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1951).
It is submitted that, because of the difficulty in many cases in deciding whether a
mistake in unilateral or mutual (see, e.g., the discussion of Warren v. Crockett, at p.
1146 infra), the risk analysis should be employed in all cases where recission is sought
on the basis of mistake.
41. 211 Tenn. 173, 364 S.W.2d 352 (1962).
42. Id. at 178, 364 S.W.2d at 354.
43. Id. at 177, 364 S.W.2d at 353.
44. Of the 326 dollars paid by the insurer, 318 dollars covered the repair
bill for the car, five dollars for the loss of use of the car, and three dollars for the
doctor's examination of plaintiff. Id. at 177, 364 S.W.2d at 353-54.
45. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Humphrey, 167 Tenn. 421, 424, 70 S.W.2d 361, 362
(1934).
46. There are extensive annotations on this point in Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 82 (1960),
and Annot., 48 A.L.R. 1462 (1927).
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regard the language of the release and apparently consider it as one
factor in determining whether rescission should be granted.
It should be noted that the term "mutual mistake" in the release
context is a misapplied label, since in these cases it is almost always
clear that the defendant made no mistake-the language of the
release shows that the defendant is not concerned with the "nature
and extent" of the injuries; he is interested only in settling for as
little as possible and being done with the matter, irrespective of the
extent of the plaintiff's injuries. The courts have dubbed this situation
as one of mutual mistake, probably because they are accustomed to
such statements as "there can be no rescission for a unilateral mistake," when in fact an assumption-of-risk analysis is applied to both
kinds of mistakes.47 Furthermore, the distinction between an unknown
injury (for which rescission of a release will be granted) and the
consequences of a known injury (for which rescission will not be
granted) is at best difficult to draw8 and has been seriously questioned.49 The suggestion has been made that this distinction be
dropped and that the question of whether to allow rescission of a release be decided by "looking at the plaintiff's conduct and words and
determining whether he had in fact assumed the risk" of what later
happened. 50
In Cofrancesco Construction Co. v. Superior Components, Inc.,51
defendant, a contractor, 52 had requested bids on various items of
lumber,5 3 including a certain amount of tongue-and-groove decking.
47. See note 40 supra.
48. The tenuity of this distinction was nicely pointed out by the case of Collier v.
Walls, 369 S.W.2d 747 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962), which was also reported during the
survey period. There the plaintiff's neck had ached for a week after the accident and
had then stopped hurting. A few days later she signed a release which was the
same in all relevant particulars as in Warren v. Crockett; it later appeared that her
neck was seriously injured. The court of appeals unanimously affirmed the chancellor's
denial of rescission of the release because, the court said, the mistake concerned the
consequences of a known injury. To recapitulate, in Warren the plaintiff was examined
by a doctor shortly after the accident; though she had no pain she was told that she
might have a whiplash injury. In Collier the plaintiff's neck hurt immediately after
the accident; she was thoroughly examined by a doctor but was told nothing about her
neck. A few days later the pain disappeared. Surely the factual differences in the
two cases are not sufficient to call for a difference in result as to whether a question
of fact is presented on the issue of rescission.
49. See, e.g., Dobbs, Conclusiveness of Personal Injury Settlements: Basic Problems,
41 N.C.L. REV. 665, 708-13 (1963). This article gives an excellent discussion of the
whole area of rescission of releases; "mutual mistake" is discussed at 702-30.
50. Id. at 708.
51. 371 S.W.2d 821 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1963).
52. This was a suit by the contractor to enjoin his supplier from enforcing a
mechanic's lien. For the sake of clarity, it is treated as if it were an action to enforce
that lien; thus the supplier is referred to as the plaintiff and the contractor as the
defendant.
53. "Both suppliers were requested to rush their bids through." 371 S.W.2d at 822.
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One supplier's bid included 4,015 dollars for yellow pine decking
meeting the specifications. Plaintiff's bid included 1,310 dollars for
Douglas fir decking, which is of higher quality than yellow pine; the
bid was intended to be in the amount of 5,310 dollars, the 4,000
dollars discrepancy being due to a typographical error. Defendant
accepted plaintiff's bid and plaintiff delivered the lumber. Before defendant used the lumber, and while he still had time to get other
lumber without delaying his work, plaintiff discovered the error and
notified defendant that plaintiff would "pick up the decking if
[defendant] was not agreeable to paying the corrected price, or if
[defendant] wished to purchase the material from another supplier.
Defendant refused to return the lumber, used it on the job, and paid
plaintiff the amount of the original bid. In this action the court of
appeals for the eastern section, in a thorough opinion by Judge
Cooper, held that the plaintiff could recover according to the amount
of the corrected bid. The court reasoned that the unilateral mistake
was material-4,000 dollars out of a total bid of 9,000 dollars-and that
it was palpable; that is, it was so clearly a mistake that the defendant
knew or should have known that plaintiff had made an error.
Alternatively, the court said that defendant, having been notified of
the mistake before it had changed its position in any 5way,
could
5
not take advantage of such an "unconscionable bargain."
The factual context of this case is unusual. In almost all cases
involving mistakes in bids, the mistake is discovered before the
goods are delivered or the services performed. The supplier will
refuse to deliver or perform and will either bring an action for
rescission on the basis of his mistake6 or use the mistake as a defense
when sued by the buyer on the contract. 57 In a few cases the supplier
has delivered the goods or performed the services and sued in quasicontract for their reasonable value.P In the instant case, however, the
award was based, not upon the reasonable value of the goods to
54. Id. at 823.
55. The best discussions on the area of unilateral mistakes in bids are found in
3 CoaBoN, CoNTRAcEs § 609 (rev. ed. 1960), and Lubell, Unilateral Palpable and
Impalpable Mistake in Construction Contracts, 16 MINN. L. Rnv. 137 (1932). It
should be noted that an application of the risk theory, discussed at note 40 supra,
produces the same results; that is, the bidder assumes the risk of any mistake in
submitting the bid, but the buyer will not be permitted to "snap-up" an offer which
he knows or has reason to know is erroneous. However, in this area, the results
produced by traditional theory in traditional terms are perfectly satisfactory; there
seems to be no good reason to change analyses in the middle of the stream.
56. E.g., M. F. Kemper Constr. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 37 Cal. 2d 696, 235 P.2d
7 (1951).
57. E.g., Geremia v. Boyarsky, 107 Conn. 387, 140 At. 749 (1928).
58. E.g., Tyra v. Cheney, 129 Minn. 428, 152 N.W. 835 (1915).
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the defendant, but rather on the basis of the corrected bid.5 9 No
previous case has been found in which this was done. The court
did not discuss the point at all; apparently it simply accepted, in the
absence of other evidence, the amount of the corrected bid as the
reasonable value of lumber.
B. Fraudand Duress
The case of Short v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad,6° resulted from

a collision between the plaintiff, who was driving her husband's car,
and the defendant's train. There was no liability insurance carried on
the car, and defendant's claim agent informed plaintiff that if she
sued, defendant "would get my driver's license and my husband's car
tags .

. . ."I'

Plaintiff needed the car in order to work. She signed a

release, which she attempted to have set aside in the instant case on
the ground of fraud. Defendant's motion for summary judgment was
granted because no "statement... by the defendant's claim agent was
a material misrepresentation." 62 Plaintiff might have fared better had
her attempt
to avoid the release been based on duress rather than
63
fraud.
59. Plaintiff had purchased the decking for 3,800 dollars; the price he quoted
defendant was 5,300 dollars, and damages were awarded on this latter basis.
60. 213 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
61. Id. at 550.
62. Id. at 551.
63. See 5 WLIsrioN, CoNTRAcTs §§ 1617-18 (rev. ed. 1937); Dobbs, supra note 49,
at 697-702; RESTATEErNT, CoN-RAcTs § 493 (1932); cf. Exum v. Washington Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 41 Tenn. App. 610, 297 S.W.2d 805 (W.S. 1955), discussed in Wade,
Restitution-1957 Tennessee Survey, 10 VAND. L. Rv. 1203, 1206 (1957).

